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In Re Lattouf's Will and the
Presumption of Lifetime Fertility
in Perpetuity Lawt

LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER*

Adoption of children is an ever-present complication of class
gifts and the Rule Against Perpetuities. Given thisfac any effort
to find the presumption of lifetimefertility rebuttable is largely illusory. The author demonstrates that the gift in In Re Lattouf's
Will could have been sustained even in face of an irrebuttable
presumption.
In Re Lattouf's Will' has become a somewhat celebrated decision in perpetuity law. It is the only perpetuity case to have allowed the presumption of lifetime fertility to be rebutted. One
would have expected such a dramatic departure from traditional
perpetuity doctrine to have led to the validity of the interest at issue. But this was not so: the testator's disposition was nevertheless held to have violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
There are two themes of this short discourse. First, holding the
presumption of lifetime fertility to be rebuttable will seldom prevent invalidity, the result sought by the principal advocate of the
rebuttable presumption, the late Professor Leach. Second, the
Lattouf case is one in which a rebuttable presumption might
t © 1983 by Lawrence W. Waggoner. Portions of this article have been
adapted from L. WAGGONER, FUTURE INTERESTS IN A NuTsHELL (1981) and from
Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 Mich. L Rev. - (In Press, Aug., 1983), and will
subsequently appear in modified form in the forthcoming book, L, WAGGONER &M.
FELLOWS, WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTUmE INTERESTS (198-).
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.B., 1960, Cincinnati; J.D.,
1963, University of Michigan.
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July 1983

Vol. 20

No. 4

HeinOnline -- 20 San Diego L. Rev. 763 1982-1983

have prevented invalidity, for the court overlooked an argument
that could have upheld the interest at issue.
PRESUMPTION OF LIFETIME FERTILITY

Traditional perpetuity doctrine holds that all persons-regardless of their age or physical condition-are conclusively presumed
to be capable of having children throughout their entire lifetime.
The presumption cannot be rebutted even though, for example,
the person in question was a man who has undergone a vasectomy, a woman who has undergone a complete hysterectomy or a
tubal ligation, or a woman who has passed the menopause.
The conclusive presumption of lifetime fertility was established
by early English decisions, of which Jee v. Audley2 is best-known
and in which Sir Lord Kenyon, the Master of the Rolls, declared:
"I am desired to do in this case something which I do not feel myself at liberty to do, namely to suppose it impossible for persons
in so advanced an age as John and Elizabeth Jee [both aged 70]
to have children; but if this can be done in one case it may in another, and it is a very dangerous experiment, and introductive of
the greatest inconvenience to give a latitude to such sort of
conjecture."3
Professor Leach mounted a formidable campaign to shift the
conclusive presumption to one that is rebuttable. 4 The purpose
was to nullify the now-famous "fertile octogenarian" type of case,
which Leach correctly identified as one of the recurring instances
where the Rule Against Perpetuities works harshly and illogically.
A prototypical "fertile octogenarian" case might be as follows. T,
a testator who at the time of his death was in his seventies, was a
widower and had no children or other descendants. His closest
blood relative was his fifty-eight-year-old sister, A, who had
passed the menopause. A had two children, X and Y. X is married, is in his early thirties, and has one child. Y, in his mid-twen2. 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
3. Id. at 325-26, 29 Eng. Rep. at 1187.
4. E.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.22 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Leach, Perpetuities: New Hampshire Defertilizes the Octogenarians, .77 HARv. L, REV. 279
(1963). The New Hampshire case that was the subject of Leach's Harvard Law Review article, In re Bassett's Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415 (1963), was in fact,
not a perpetuity case; it was a trust termination case. Leach acknowledged this,
but still ballyhooed the case as a great breakthrough. As a trust termination case,
Bassett was hardly pathbreaking in allowing rebuttal of the presumption of lifetime fertility. In 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRusTs § 340.1, nA (3d ed. 1967), several
trust termination cases predating Bassett are cited that reached the same conclu-

sion where, as in Bassett, the evidence that the person in question was incapable
of having natural-born children was uncontroverted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 340 comment e (1959).
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ties, is unmarried. T's property is bequeathed in trust, directing
the trustee to pay the net income "to my sister A for life, then to
A's children for the life of the survivor, and upon the death of the
last survivor of A and her children to pay the corpus of the trust
to A's grandchildren."
As formulated by Professor John Chipman Gray, the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities states that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest."5 Gray's formulation, considered by the courts to be the classic statement of the
Rule, expresses rather clearly the Rule's requirement of initial
certainty: If there exists at the commencement of the perpetuity
period any possible chain of events that might subsequently arise
that would result in the questioned interest's remaining contingent beyond a life in being plus twenty-one years, the interest is
invalid. The remainder interest in favor of A's grandchildren fails
this test. The invalidating chain of possible events is that A will
have a child (Z), conceived and born after T's death, who will
have a child conceived and born more than twenty-one years after
the death of the survivor of A, X, and y.6
The linchpin in this invalidating chain of events is the acceptance of the possibility that A will have a child after T's death.
The acceptance of this possibility appears in turn to be dependent
upon the conclusive character of the presumption of lifetime fertility. If the presumption were rebuttable and deemed to be rebutted by A's having passed the menopause, the invalidating
chain of events would vanish. The last survivor would be bound
to be A, X or Y, all of whom were in being at T's death. The requirement of initial certainty would have been met because the
grandchildren's interest would be certain to vest no later than at
the death of lives in being.
Leach's campaign against the conclusive presumption was
largely ineffective. Section 377 of the Restatement of Property
squarely supports the conclusive presumption, and there are
5. J.

GRAY, THE

RULE

AGAINST PERPETUITIES

§ 201 (2d ed. 1906). The Rule

first appeared in its present form in the second edition of his book, and was carried forward in subsequent editions without change.
6. The grandchildren's remainder interest is a class gift. All class gifts are
subject to the Rule, and under the "all or nothing" rule of Leake v. Robinson, 2
Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817), are entirely invalid if the interest of any potential member of the class might vest too remotely.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 377 (1944) ("[i]n applying the Rule
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many perpetuity cases, recent as well as not so recent, that have
adhered to it.8 Lattouf is the only American common law decision in a perpetuity case to have squarely held that the presumption is rebuttable. The court in Lattouf, in a few conclusory
sentences, brushed the traditional view aside:
Defendants-contestants rely upon the ancient legal presumption, often
mentioned in our cases, that a woman is presumed legally capable of bearing children at any age....
However, we are unwilling to follow the contestants in their reliance
upon the ancient presumption. As was said in Trenton Banking Co. v.
Hawley, 7 N.J. Super. 301, 307-308, 70 A.2d 896 (Ch. Div. 1950), the presumption should not, merely because of its antiquity, blind us to present realities and conceal demonstrable truth.... The hysterectomy, involving
complete removal of Marie Endres' procreative organs, rendered her perbear no children other
manently sterile. It logically follows that she could
than the only child she had when testator died. 9

It is doubtful that allowing the presumption to be rebuttable, as
Leach argued and as the Lattouf court held, is a solution to the
so-called fertile octogenarian problem. Even if the presumption
were rebuttable, it could seldom be sufficiently rebutted to save a
perpetuity violation as long as the requirement of initial certainty
remains the test for validity. Given the biological variables with
the usual infertility conditions, the most that could be established
in a majority of situations would be that it was unlikely, perhaps
even extremely unlikely, that the person in question could have
more children.l0
Should the impossibility of the birth of natural children be conclusively established, as in Lattouf," the initial certainty test for
validity is still unsatisfied. What the Lattouf court failed to consider was the possibility of having children by adoption. Since
the trend is strongly toward the inclusion of adopted children in
class gifts,12 it is difficult to see how the Lattouf court could hold
Against Perpetuities, a man or woman is treated as capable of having children as
long as life lasts").
8. E.g., Turner v. Turner, 260 S.C. 439, 442, 196 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1973) ("[t]he
possibility of childbirth," the court said, "is never extinct"); Abram v. Wilson, 8
Ohio Misc. 420, 423, 220 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1966) ("[o]bviously," the court said of the
testator's 75-year-old brother, "it is clearly possible for [him] to have children
...

M).

9. 87 N.J. Super. at 144, 208 A.2d at 415 (citations omitted).
10. Medical science may sometimes stand in the way of establishing infertility.
Can it be held, for example, that a man who has undergone a vasectomy cannot
have children, given the possibility of surgical reversal? For further discussion of
this and related points, see Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against
Perpetuitites, 15 U.C.LZA. L REv. 420 (1968).
11. A complete hysterectomy was regarded as sufficient by the Lattouf court.
87 N.J. Super. at 144, 208 A.2d at 415. In the above hypothetical example, A's having gone through the menopause may also be sufficient.
12. Adopted children are presumptively included in class gifts in New Jersey,
the jurisdiction in which Lattouf was decided, although this matter may have been
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that the presumption had been rebutted in view of the fact that
the adoption of children is hardly out of the question where as in
Lattouf, the wife is in her normal childbearing years but sterile.
Indeed, since even elderly people like A in the above example
probably cannot be excluded from adopting children based on
their age alone,13 the possibility of adopting children is seldom

extinct.14
EFFECT

OF ADOPTION

As indicated above, in Lattouf itself, the court held the presumption not only to be rebuttable but-by ignoring the possibility of having children by adoption-also to have been rebutted.
Despite this, the court still held that the interest in question vioin some doubt when the decision in Lattouf was rendered. See In re Thompson, 53
N.J. 276, 250 A.2d 393 (1969).
13. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973);
Madsen v. Chasten, 7111. App. 3d 21, 286 N.E.2d 505 (1972); In re Adoption of Christian, 184 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286
N.E.2d 478 (1972). Cases are collected in Annot., 84 A.LR3d 665 (1978); 56 A.LR.2d
823 (1957); see also H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NuTSrELL § 15.3 (1977). The ages

of the petitioners can be considered, however, in determining whether the adoption would be in the best interests of the child. In re Adoption of Randolph, 68
Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975).
14. Precedent in the trust termination area holds that the capability of a particular person's having a child is not conclusively presumed. See case cited supra
note 4. However, recent termination cases have refused to disregard the possibility of a person's having a child by adoption despite the person's inability to have
natural-born children. See, e.g., Clark v. Citizen's & S. Nat'l Bank, 243 Ga. 703, 257
S.E.2d 244 (1979). The Clark court held that the conclusive presumption was still
followed in Georgia, but went on to indicate that even if the presumption were rebuttable it would not have been rebutted in this case; although there was uncontroverted medical evidence that the 59-year-old woman in question was no longer
capable of bearing children, the possibility of her adopting a child was not extinct.
Professor Leach thought perpetuity law should also emulate tax treatment of
the fertility presumption. See 6 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 24.22.
But recent precedent in the tax area has refused to disregard the possibility of a
person's having a child by adoption despite the person's inability to have naturalborn children. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 410, 1974-2 C.B. 187 (possibility of a 60-year-old
woman's adopting one or more children is not so remote as to be negligible; charitable deduction denied); Rev. Rul 442, 1971-2 C.B. 336 (possibility of a 56-year-old
man's adopting a child is not so remote as to be negligible; charitable deduction
denied).
Leach anticipated this problem, but nevertheless persevered in his criticism of
the conclusive presumption in perpetuity law. This was his "answer" to the problem of adopted children: "Ay, there's the rub ....
This sort of thing is my reason
for preferring statutory change on the cy pres principle, Le., directing the court to
reform the disposition to approximate the intention of the testator or settlor
within the limits of the Rule." Leach, supra note 4, at 282.
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lated the Rule. If the possibility of having children by adoption is
disregarded the court's conclusion was in error; further, unlike
the more typical case exemplified by the hypothetical discussed
previously, taking the possibility of having children by adoption
into consideration does not necessarily destroy the argument for
validity.15
To develop the argument, it is helpful to examine the facts of
Lattouf and the court's analysis offered in support of its conclusion. The testator, Sarkis Lattouf, an eighty-year-old bachelor
when he died, created a trust of the residue of his estate. The income from the trust was to be used in the discretion of the
trustee for various specified purposes. As to the corpus, the will
provided: "When the youngest child of my niece, Marie Endres,
shall have attained, or would have attained the age of twenty-five
(25) years, then the trust hereby created shall end, and the principal thereof... shall be equally... divided among my then living
grandnephews and grandnieces."' 6 Surviving the testator were
three sisters and forty-one nephews and nieces. Marie Endres,
one of the surviving nieces, had one child, Linda. Linda was just
short of three years and ten months old at the testator's death.
Marie had undergone a complete hysterectomy prior to the testator's death, which the parties stipulated rendered her "incapable
of bearing children when the will was executed and the testator
died."17
Had the testator lived two months and a few days longer, so
that Linda would have reached her fourth birthday by the time of
his death, the contingent interest of the grandnephews and grandnieces in the corpus of the residuary trust would have unquestionably been valid. The twenty-fifth anniversary of Linda's birth
would be certain to occur within twenty-one years of the testator's death. But the fact that Linda was two months and a few
days short of her fourth birthday when the testator died was fatal,
in the court's view. The court's analysis was brief, consisting of
the following paragraphs:
We must look at the corpus provision of paragraph Seventh as of the
date of testator's death. Would the trust corpus vest within a life in being
plus 21 years? The answer is clearly no.
The rule would be violated were we to take Linda as the measuring
life.... Linda was born December 1, 1958; Lattouf died September 26,
1962, so that the child... was at least two months short of age 4. Accord15. There is, incidentally, no indication in the opinion that the argument for
validity presented here was rigorously made to the court, and so, the court's decision ought not to be taken as a rejection of it.
16. 87 N.J. Super. at 141, 208 A.2d at 413.
17. Id. at 143, 208 A.2d at 415.
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ingly, had she died immediately after the execution of the will and Lattouf's death, more than 21 years would expire before she "would have
attained" age 25.
So, too, were we to take Marie Endres as the measuring life. Had she
died immediately after Lattouf, the trust would not have vested within her
life and 21 years thereafter.
As our cases have uniformly held, a future interest must vest, if at all,
within a period measured by a life in being when the interest was created,
plus 21 years. The nine-month period tacked on in case of an existing
pregnancy has no application in the circumstances of this case. Marie En-

dres was not pregnant. She could not be, nor, of course, could the infant
Linda. Although plaintifrs counsel claimed at oral argument that consideration should be given to this extra term of gestation, he has now abandoned the argument, and necessarily so.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trust failed because it was in violation
of the rule.

18

The procedure for determining whether an interest violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities' 9 is to postulate the death of each person who is connected in some way to the transaction and ask. Is
there with respect to this person an invalidating chain of possible
events? In order for the answer to be negative, so that the person
is the measuring (or validating) life, there must be a certainty
that the vesting or failure of the interest will occur no later than
twenty-one years after that person's death. If there is no such
certainty, that person cannot be the measuring (or validating)
life. This was essentially the procedure followed by the court in
Lattouf. The court postulated the death of Linda and of her
mother Marie, and properly concluded that with respect to both
there was an invalidating chain of possible events. Since Marie
was deemed incapable of having children, Linda was taken by the
court to be the youngest of her children. Linda being two months
and a few days short of her fourth birthday at the testator's death,
the disposition in effect constituted a direction to pay the corpus
of the trust to such of the testator's grandnephews and grandnieces as were living twenty-one years and two months 20 after his
death. Should both Marie and Linda die during the two-month
period following the testator's death, the vesting or failure of the
interest in the corpus would occur more than twenty-one years
later.
18. Id. at 145, 208 A.2d at 415-16 (citations omitted).
19. This procedure is spelled out in more detail in Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MIcH. L. REv. - (1983).
20. For the sake of convenience, the period is subsequently referred to as a 21year-and-2-month period rather than a period of 21 years, 2 months, and a few

days.
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The court's error was in limiting its search for measuring lives
to Linda and Marie. A wider search would have revealed that a
group of measuring lives arguably exists for which there is no invalidating chain of possible events. The class of legatees-the
grandnieces and grandnephews that survive the twenty-one-yearand-two-month period following the testator's death-implicitly
contains three categories: 1. the grandnieces (including Linda)
and grandnephews who were living at the testator's death; 2. any
grandnieces and grandnephews who were born after the testator's
death but who were in gestation at his death; and 3. any grandnieces and grandnephews who are conceived and born after the
testator's death (hereafter referred to as after-born).
If measuring lives can be found for each of these three categories, the class gift ought to be valid. Measuring lives for the first
and the second categories are easy. The grandnieces and grandfall into these two categories are their own measurnephews who
21
ing lives.
It is the third category, the one composed of the potentially after-born grandnieces and grandnephews, that presents the difficulty. These potential class members cannot serve as their own
measuring lives. Some other group must be found to validate the
gift to this category if the gift to the entire class is to be saved.
Such a group exists, but its recognition depends upon the court's
willingness to accept the proposition that a viable child cannot be
conceived and born all within a two-month period; that is, that
there is no conclusive presumption of instantaneous birth. If the
court would accept the impossibility of births of viable children
21. It is well established, though sometimes overlooked, that in appropriate
cases the legatees of a questioned interest can be their own measuring lives. E.g.,
Rand v. Bank of Cal., 236 Or. 619, 626-27, 388 P.2d 437, 440 (1964). This is an especially useful principle in cases where an interest is contingent on reaching an age
in excess of 21 years or, as in Lattouf, is contingent on survivorship of a period in
gross that exceeds 21 years. To give an example, suppose that a testator devised
real property "to such of A's children as are living on the twenty-fifth anniversary
of my death." A predeceased the testator. At the testator's death, A had three
living children. The executory interest in favor of A's children does not violate the
Rule because A's children are their own measuring lives. Each one of A's children
will either survive the twenty-five-year period in gross or fail to do so within his
own lifetime. To say this another way, we will know no later than at the time of
the death of each child whether or not that child survived the required period in
gross.
The only difference between this example and the Lattouf case is that the principle that the legatees can be their own measuring lives is sufficient by itself to
uphold the interest of all the class members. In Lattouf, since there are possible
after-born grandnieces and grandnephews, the principle upholds only the interests of the members of the class who were in being at the testator's death. Because of the all-or-nothing rule pertaining to class gifts, these gifts cannot be
found partly valid and partly invalid. Consequently, measuring lives must be
found for the potential after-born members if the class gift is to be upheld.
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occurring within two months of conception, then the measuring
lives for the third category are the mothers of the potential afterborn grandnieces and grandnephews-the nieces and wives of the
nephews. If a child cannot be born viable within two months of
its conception, then it follows that any after-born grandniece or
grandnephew would have to be born more than two months after
the testator's death. And from that it follows that such afterborn's mother (a life in being) could not die more than twenty-

one years prior to the expiration of the twenty-one-year-and-two-

month term.22

Is the above argument for validity destroyed if the possibility of
having children by adoption is not disregarded? Unlike the more
typical case discussed earlier, there are reasons with respect to
the facts of Lattouf for suggesting not. This problem has two aspects. First, there is the possibility of a child's acquiring the status of grandnephew or grandniece by being adopted into the class
by a niece or nephew after the testator's death. In such cases, the
final order of adoption will be issued either during or after the
two-month period following the testator's death. If it is issued afterward, identifying measuring lives presents no difficulty: They
would be the adopting niece or nephew. As to any child adopted
during the two-month period, such child would have to have been
born or at least in gestation at the testator's death, and so could
be his or her own measuring life.23
22. Using the mothers as the measuring lives for the after-born grandnieces
and grandnephews is predicated upon their mothers having been alive at the testator's death. For the sake of technical completeness, there must also be taken
into account the possibility that the mothers of some of the after-born grandnieces
and grandnephews might not be in being at the testator's death but rather might
themselves be conceived and born thereafter. The proposition that all mothers of
viable children must live more than two months beyond the date of conception
solves this problem also. The measuring lives for any children of an after-born
niece or nephew would be the mothers of such after-born nieces and nephewsthe testator's sisters. Any sister of the testator who had an after-born niece or
nephew could not die more than 21 years prior to the 21-year-and-2-month term.
(If the testator had been survived by one or more brothers, the measuring lives
would then include the brothers' wives; and in the case of an after-born wife, the
wife's mother; and so on.) To take account of the possibility of a nephew (who
was in being at the testator's death) marrying a woman who was conceived and
born after the testator's death (who would then give birth to an after-born grandniece or grandnephew), the woman's mother would be the measuring life; and one
could also note that any such nephew who married an after-born wife would himself have to live for more than two months after the testator's death, and so could
not die more than 21 years before the twenty-fifth anniversary of Linda's birth.
23. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 comment e (Tent. Draft No.
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The other aspect of the problem posed by adoptions concerns
Marie herself. Her sterility notwithstanding, it was clearly possible for her to adopt children after the testator's death. As argued
earlier, this possibility should have prevented the court from concluding that the presumption of lifetime fertility had been rebut-

ted. Would holding that Marie was capable of having additional
children (if only by adoption) destroy the above argument for va-

lidity? Keep in mind that the remainder interest in the corpus
was contingent on survivorship of the time when Marie's "young-

est" child becomes or would have become twenty-five. Treating
Linda as Marie's "youngest" child is crucial to the argument for

validity, for it enabled the time of required survivorship to be
translated into a twenty-one-year-and-two-month period in gross.

But holding that Marie was still capable of having children (by
adoption) would not necessitate treating any child other than

Linda as Marie's "youngest" for purposes of construing the testator's disposition. No matter how many children Marie might later
adopt, Linda was Marie's youngest child at the time of the testator's death. Admittedly, class gifts that are contingent on survivorship to the time when a person's youngest child reaches a
certain age are usually construed to refer to the time when the
youngest whenever born (or adopted) reaches the designated

age,2 4 and sometimes such gifts are construed to relate to the
time when the youngest of all existing class members reaches the
2, 1979) ("a child that may be later adopted [can be] a measuring life as long as
such [child] was alive when the period of the rule begins to run"). See also id.
illustration 6. Unfortunately, there is New Jersey precedent that could be read as
saying that an adopted child is considered to come into being on the effective date
of the order of adoption, irrespective of the child's actual date of birth or conception. See In re Estate of Markowitz, 126 N.J. Super. 140, 312 A.2d 901 (1973) (the
court said: "Born when? ... Regardless of the time when an adopted child is
physically born, he or she does not come into existence as a child of the adoptive
parent (in the sense that the law equates the relationship of a natural-born child
with that of an adopted child) until the effective date of the order of adoption").
Id. at 145, 312 A.2d at 904. If this notion were applied for perpetuity purposes,
there would arise an invalidating chain of possible events, for there would then be
the possibility of instantaneous "births" followed by the death of the adopting
niece or nephew, all occurring during the two-month period after the testator's
death. Markowitz, however, was not a perpetuity case, and there is reason for
thinking that for perpetuity purposes the Restatement (Second) rule would be followed. The issue in Markowitz was whether a child who was adopted by the testator after his will was executed but born before the execution of the will was
covered by a pretermitted heir statute that granted an intestate share to children
"born" after the date of execution of the will. The court, in holding that an
adopted child is deemed to be "born" on the date of adoption, was merely deciding
the time when an adopted child becomes part of-or is "born" into--the adopting
family, not when such a child comes into being for purposes of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.

24. L SIMES & A. SMi

THE LA oF FTURE INTERETs § 646 (2d ed. 1956); 5

AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 22.44.
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designated age.25 But there is ample precedent-outside of New
Jersey, at least-supporting the idea that if either of these constructions would result in a perpetuity violation, as it would in
Lattouf, the word "youngest" should be construed to refer to the
youngest living at the testator's death, in order to uphold the

gift.2

6

Professor Samuel M. Fetters published an article in 1976, in
which he also concluded that the Lattouf disposition ought to
have been upheld.27 Though the problem of adopted children was
not addressed, the Fetters argument concerning Lattouf was gen28
erally similar to the one advanced above.
25. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 295 comment k (1940).

26. L. SnWss & A. SMIrrH, supra note 24, at 95; 5 AMERICAN LAW

OF PROPERTY,

supra note 4, § 22.44. This is simply an application of the general constructional
preference for validity. See L. WAGGONER, FUTURE INTERESTS IN A NUTSHELL § 12.9
(1981). In Lattouf itself, the court specifically rejected the trial court's construction of "youngest" as meaning the youngest living at the testator's death. 87 N.T.
Super. at 143, 208 A.2d at 414-15. But the court did so in apparent ignorance of the
fact that this construction would have facilitated upholding the gift. Further supporting the adoption of this construction is the fact that the court specifically
found that the testator knew of Marie's hysterectomy when he executed his will
Id. at 144, 208 A.2d at 415. Given this knowledge, it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that the testator had Linda in mind when he used the words "youngest
child of my niece, Marie." See L. WAGGONER, supra note 25, § 12.13 (a).
27. Fetters, The PerpetuitiesPeriodin Gross and the Child En Ventre Sa Mere
in Relation to the Determination of Common-Law and Wait-and-See Measuring
Lives: A Minor Heresy Stated and Defended, 62 IOWA L. REV. 309 (1976).
28. The Fetters argument is not identical to mine, but the differences do not
seem significant enough to warrant discussion in the text. Among the differences
is the fact that the Fetters article identifies the nieces and nephews as the measuring lives, rather than-as I did-the nieces and the nephews' wives. See Fetters,
supra note 27, at 317-18. Similarly, though the possibility of an after-born niece or
nephew is handled in the Fetters article by identifying the testator's sisters as the
measuring lives, it is strongly implied that the brothers would be included in the
group of measuring lives if the testator had been survived by brothers. See id. at
318-19. I, on the other hand, would prefer to restrict the group of measuring lives
for all after-born children to their mothers. See supra note 22. Oddly, in connection with a different example, the Fetters article used only the mothers of afterborn children as the measuring lives. Fetters, supra note 27, at 329-30.
Although the Fetters article does not address the point, there is a problem with
including the fathers (a nephew, and a brother) in the group of measuring lives: it
is possible for a man to father a child and die within the two-month period following the testator's death. The answer to this problem may very well be the proposition that where an actual pregnancy exists, the period of the Rule is extended to a
life in being plus 21 years plus the actual period of gestation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 (1944); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4,
§ 24.15. It is sometimes said, however, that the correct formulation of the significance of an actual pregnancy is rather more narrow: the significance merely is
that a child "thereafter born alive is deemed to be in being when begotten ......
L. SisS &A. SmrrH, supra note 21, § 1224. Oddly enough, the Fetters article states
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The main theme of the Fetters article, however, is much
broader: it is that there should be accepted the absolute proposition that the period-in-gross part of the perpetuity period is not
twenty-one years but rather twenty-one years "plus an additional
period in gross of less than five months to account for the minimum human gestation period." 2 9 This is true, the article contends, because the argument for validity in Lattouf can be
extended to support the hypothesis that whenever there is a period in gross that exceeds twenty-one years by no more than the
"minimum human gestation period," which the article identifies
as "no less than four and one half calendar months,"30 there will
always be measuring lives that will validate the disposition.
If it is correct that there will always be measuring lives to support the validity of a period in gross that exceeds twenty-one
years by no more than the minimum human gestation period,
then perhaps it is defensible-though in my judgment not very
helpful-to translate the point into the absolute proposition that
the perpetuity period in gross is twenty-one years plus an additional period in gross of less than five months, to account for the
minimum human gestation period. In fact, however, the argument for validity in Lattouf does not by itself support the hypothesis that there will always be measuring lives to validate a period
in gross that exceeds twenty-one years by no more than the minimum human gestation period. The validity of that hypothesis requires the acceptance of several untested propositions in addition
to the idea that a child cannot be conceived and born viable
within a two-month period.
The example that serves to demonstrate this comes from the article itself: A conveys land to the B Corporation in fee simple,
"but if the land is ever used for business purposes within twentyone years and two months from this date, then to X and his
heirs." The article contends that X's executory interest is valid
because if X is not alive or en ventre when the land is conveyed,
the proposition this way. Fetters, supra note 27, at 311-13. The narrow formula-

tion, however, would not allow the use of the fathers as the measuring lives for
their after-born children.
My preference for restricting the measuring lives for after-born children to their
mothers is based solely on the fact that doing so avoids an argument over which of
the above formulations is the "correct" one. I would have no difficulty in accepting
the broader formulation as the "correct" one. In fact, it might become necessary
to rely on the broader formulation if medical science some day succeeds in saving
a child in cases where the mother died within two months of conception. Cf. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1977, at B16, coL 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1977, at 30, coL 5 (unsuccess-

ful attempt to try to save a four-month-old fetus by maintaining the dead mother's
body functions with mechanical life-support apparatus).
29. Fetters, supra note 27, at 309-10.
30. Fetters, supra note 27, at 309 n.1.
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then the minimum gestation period must be subtracted from the
contingency period of twenty-one years and two months. 31 Therefore, according to Fetters, the executory interest in X or his heirs
will vest or fail within the twenty-one year period required by the
Rule.
Assuming that the successors in interest of a grantee can be
used as measuring lives (a proposition that to my knowledge is itself untested), there is a possible chain of events overlooked by
the above analysis, which arises because of the erroneous assumption that X's successor in interest will be human. There are
other possibilities, two of which are that the executory interest
might pass under X's will to an existing charity, or in the absence
of a valid will it might escheat to the state. Since X's death might
occur during the first two months following the date of the conveyance, at which time his executory interest might pass to such
a non-human successor in interest, X's executory interest cannot
be deemed valid by reference to the relatively finite group of measuring lives suggested by the Fetters article-X and such of his
human legatees (or his human heirs) and their mothers or more
31. The executory interest in X clearly is contingent. Furthermore, X's
interest is transmissible, which means that he need not survive the contingency for his interest to vest. If he were to die, his contingent executory interest would pass to his testamentary or intestate successor ....
All that is required for validity under the Rule Against Perpetuities is
that the nonvested interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of some
life in being at the creation of the interest. Let us take another look at X.
If he were to die the day after the deed of transfer, which must be contemplated under the all possibilities test of the Rule, as we have seen, his executory interest would remain contingent for more than twenty-one years.
But if X were to die within the first two months of the transfer, his contingent executory interest would pass to someone. Again, we know not who
that successor to X's interest might be. There are, however, only two possibilities concerning that person's life that bear any relevance to the validity or invalidity of X's interest. The successor to X's contingent interest
was either alive at the date of the deed or he was not. If he was alive, or
en ventre sa mere, he will either survive the contingency or fail to survive
the contingency within his own lifetime. If the successor to X's interest
was not alive or not en ventre at the date of the deed, then he will have to
have been born more than the minimum gestation period thereafter. The
interest must now vest, if at all, in him or his successor in interest less
than twenty-one years thereafter, because the minimum gestation period
must be subtracted from the gross period of contingency to account for
the time that elapsed while a life in being at the date of the deed continued to live for a minimum gestation period. It is, therefore, impossible for
the interest to vest remotely. If there are any other possibilities in the arrangement of births, deaths and actual periods of gestation to cause this
gift to vest beyond lives in being and twenty-one years, I must confess
a I am unable to perceive them.
Fetters, supra note 27, at 328-29 (footnote omitted).
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remote maternal ancestors as were in being at the date of the
conveyance.
If the measuring lives suggested by the Fetters article are insufficient to uphold X's executory interest, are there other ways of
arguing for its validity? The search for measuring lives could be
shifted from X and his successors in interest to the B Corporation. If it is acceptable to look behind a corporate entity to the
humans who own or control it (an untested proposition), then the
measuring lives could be the corporate officers who have authority during the twenty-one-year-and-two-month period to decide
whether the land is or is not to be used for business purposes.
Such persons comprise a relatively finite group. The argument
would of course be that all such persons would either be in being
at the date of the conveyance or after-born, and if after-born they
would have had a mother or more remote maternal ancestor who
was in being at the date of the conveyance and who lived more
than two months thereafter.
But recall that the Fetters hypothesis is that no matter what the
disposition, there will always be measuring lives to uphold a period in gross that exceeds twenty-one years by no more than the
minimum human gestation period. Suppose A's conveyance is
changed so that the contingency does not require a human act:
"to the B Corporationin fee simple, but if the Huron River dries
up within twenty-one years and two months from this date, then
to X and his heirs."
We now seem to be forced to focus on the humans controlling
or owning a non-human entity even though their decisions or actions have nothing to do with the occurrence of the event described in the contingency. We could continue to focus on the B
Corporationor we could focus again on X's successor in interest.
Perhaps validity could be established by adding to the Fetterssuggested group of measuring lives, the persons who during the
twenty-one-year-and-two-month period occupy, say, the position
of chief executive officer of the B Corporation or of any nonhuman entity to which the executory interest might pass within
two months of the conveyance. Looking behind a non-human entity to the humans occupying certain positions within it is more
attenuated here than it was in the original case, where the B Corporation's fee would be divested if the land should be used for
business purposes. In that case, the measuring lives-the officers
of B Corporationfrom time to time empowered to make the decision about the use of the land-have a causal connection to the
happening of the contingency.
Perhaps ultimately the validity of X's executory interest re-
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quires the abandonment of the B Corporation or X's successor in
interest as the source of measuring lives, and a shift to the entire
population of the world in being at the date of the conveyance.
The argument for validity, in other words, would be as follows: If
all the people in the world should die within two months of the
conveyance, the executory interest will fail within lives in being;
any people who are alive during the twenty-one-year period following the first two months will either have been in being at the
date of the conveyance or will have been after-born, and if they
are after-born they will of necessity have had a mother or some
other maternal ancestor who was alive at the date of the conveyance and who lived more than two months thereafter. Acceptance
of this line of reasoning would require a court to overcome a principle that has become part of standard perpetuity doctrine, which
is that the measuring lives must be reasonable in number.32 The
purpose underlying this principle is that the job of tracing an unreasonably large group of persons so as to determine when the
last member died would be difficult, expensive, and perhaps impossible. But of course in this case this underlying purpose is inapposite because there is no need to trace the measuring lives,-.
and thus no need to insist on the reasonable-in-number
restriction.
My basic point about the Fetters hypothesis is not that it is necessarily wrong or logically flawed. It is, however, more dubitable
than the argument for validity in Lattouf because its acceptance
requires inquiry into so many areas that perpetuity courts have
never had occasion to decide. The argument for validity in Lattouf is itself dubitable because its acceptance requires courts to
consider for the first time whether for perpetuity purposes a viable child's mother is to be deemed to be certain to live for at least
two months beyond the date of conception. It would be extravagant, indeed, to suggest that the Fetters hypothesis is entitled to
be accepted as established perpetuity doctrine.
CONCLUSION

This short discourse on the Lattouf case and the presumption
of lifetime fertility ends where it began, on a somewhat modest
note. It is often easy to label a rule, developed at an earlier time,
32. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
§ 1.3 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979); In re Moore, [1901] 1 Ch. 936.

PROPERTY
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as anachronistic. The conclusive presumption of lifetime fertility
is such a rule. But the strong tendency is toward the inclusion of
adopted children in class gifts. Even elderly people probably cannot be excluded from adopting children based on their age alone,
and it certainly is far from unlikely that a sterile person in his
normal child-bearing years will adopt a child. Surely any court
inclined to make a shift to a rebuttable presumption must come
to grips with the problem of adoption and not ignore it as the
court did in Lattouf. Furthermore, any court that does come to
grips with the problem ought to conclude that making such a shift
would be a largely illusory maneuver. Even in the peculiar fact
situation of the Lattouf case, the argument that I advanced in
favor of validity is at no point dependent upon the rebuttability of
the presumption of lifetime fertility.
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